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Abstract 32 
In recent years, global hunger has begun to rise, returning to levels from a decade ago. Climate change 33 
is a key driver behind these recent rises and is one of the leading causes of severe food crises. When 34 
coupled with population growth and land use change, future climate variability is predicted to have 35 
profound impacts on global food security. We examine future global impacts of climate variability, 36 
population and land use change on food security to 2050, using the modelling framework FEEDME 37 
(Food Estimation and Export for Diet and Malnutrition Evaluation). The model uses national food 38 
balance sheets (FBS) to determine mean per-capita calories, hence incorporating an assumption that 39 
minimum dietary energy requirements (MDER) remain constant. To account for climate variability, we 40 
use two Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on 41 
Climate Change (IPCC), alongside three Shared Socio-economic Pathway (SSP) scenarios incorporating 42 
land use and population change within the model. Our results indicate that SSP scenarios have a larger 43 
impact on future food insecurity, in particular because of projected changes in population. Countries 44 
with a projected decrease in population growth had higher food security, whilst those with a projected 45 
rapid population growth tended to experience the worst impacts on food security. Although climate 46 
change scenarios had an effect on future crop yields, population growth appeared to be the dominant 47 
driver of change in undernourishment prevalence. Therefore strategies to mitigate the consequences 48 
of projected population growth, including improved maternal healthcare, increasing equality of access 49 
to food at the national level, closing the yield gap and changes in trade patterns, are essential to 50 
ensuring severe future food insecurity is avoided.  51 
Key words: Food security, FEEDME model, undernourishment,  52 
Introduction 53 
Global hunger is currently rising and has been since 2014, after years of decline (FAO et al., 2018). The 54 
proportion of undernourished people worldwide increased to 10.6% in 2015, and then to 11% in 2016 55 
(UN, 2018). According to the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations the 56 
number of undernourished people in the world reached an estimated 821 million in 2017, which is 57 
around one in nine people (FAO et al., 2018). This rise in food insecurity indicates a significant risk of 58 
falling short of achieving the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of hunger eradication by 59 
2030 (FAO et al., 2018). 60 
Food security was defined at the 1996 World Food summit as ‘existing when all people, at all times, 61 
have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary 62 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO, 2008). It is determined by four main 63 
factors: (1) Availability e.g. access to productive land and agricultural production, (2) Access, 64 
physically, socially and economically, (3) Utilisation e.g. food preparation and diversity of diet, and (4) 65 
Stability across the first three dimensions. Major disasters, for example would affect the stability of a 66 
countries’ food security, of which 80% of those internationally reported are climate related (FAO et 67 
al., 2018).  68 
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Climate variability and extremes are a significant driver of increases in global hunger (FAO et al., 2018). 69 
The changing nature of climate variability and extremes negatively affects all four dimensions of food 70 
security (FAO et al., 2018). It has direct impacts on crop production, with an estimated 3.1-7.4% 71 
reduction in global yields of major crops for each degree-Celsius increase in global mean temperature 72 
(Zhao et al., 2017). Using a 2005 baseline, projections forecast an increase in global crop demand of 73 
100-110% by 2050 (Tilman et al., 2011), which is propelled by population growth and greater per 74 
capita income (Godfray et al., 2010). Even more recent projections which use 2014 as a baseline 75 
estimate an increase in production of 25-70% is necessary for meeting crop demand in 2050 (Hunter 76 
et al., 2017).  77 
The world’s population is currently growing by approximately 1.1% per year, and if current trends 78 
continue, according to the medium-variant projection, the world’s population is projected to reach 79 
9.7 billion by 2050 (UN, 2019). Despite inherent uncertainty in population projections, with recent 80 
years overestimating population growth (Keilman, 1998), it is with 95% certainty that by 2050, the 81 
global population will stand between 9.4 and 10.1 billion (UN, 2019).  More than half of this 82 
anticipated growth is expected to occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, adding 1.05 billion people between 83 
2019 and 2050 (UN, 2019). Two-thirds of the projected growth is projected to be attributed to current 84 
age structures, hence even if fertility levels declined, population growth would continue (UN, 2019). 85 
The majority of the increase in global population, however, can be attributed to a small number of 86 
countries. From 2019-2050, more than half of the world’s population growth will be concentrated in 87 
just nine countries: India, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, the 88 
United States of America, Egypt and Indonesia (UN, 2019).  89 
The majority of these are Low-Income Countries (LIC), hence it is expected that there will be limited 90 
resources and access to technology to sustainably produce more food for growing populations. 91 
Although investment of agricultural GDP in technology is increasing worldwide, it is uneven, with 92 
spending equivalent to 3.25% in High-Income Countries (HIC).  For LICs, where the vast majority of 93 
increased food demand will occur and the greatest impact could be seen from closing the yield gap, 94 
only 0.52% of agricultural GDP is spent on investing in research and development, despite strong 95 
evidence that this investment effectively alleviates poverty (Tilman et al., 2002, Fuglie et al., 2020). A 96 
lack of investment in technology coupled with increased fluctuations in crop yields due to climate 97 
change could lead to an accelerated cropland expansion into unsuitable lands, including conversion of 98 
natural forests (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011). Matching the rapidly increasing and changing demand 99 
for food, in ways which are environmentally and socially sustainable, whilst making sure no one goes 100 
hungry is one of the worlds’ biggest challenges (Godfray et al., 2010). However, future projections of 101 
population, land use and crop yield changes vary with different socio-economic and climate 102 
conditions. Therefore, in this study we aim to compare future effects on global food security across a 103 
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range of scenarios, building on the Dawson et al. (2016) study, which examined the impacts of changes 104 
in crop yields on global food security under the SRES A1B climate scenario.  105 
In this study, we use two representative concentration pathways (RCPs) to demonstrate climate 106 
change impacts on future crop yields. We also examine three Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs) 107 
projecting different population change and cropland expansion scenarios to 2050. By altering the 108 
parameters of the Food Estimation and Export for Diet and Malnutrition Evaluation (FEEDME) model 109 
according to these scenarios, we have three main objectives; firstly to compare impacts of different 110 
scenarios on national food security. Secondly to indicate the key drivers of undernourishment 111 
prevalence from making these comparisons, and thirdly to demonstrate which areas on a global scale 112 
are most likely to be at risk of undernourishment in the future across all scenarios considered. This is 113 
in order to direct climate change mitigation and adaptation, and food security strategies.  114 
Methods 115 
The FEEDME model as described in Dawson et al. (2016) was used to analyse undernourishment 116 
prevalence at a national level. This modelling framework, as detailed in Figure 1, uses the dietary 117 
energy provision-based methodology adopted by the FAO (FAO, 2004) to allow for comparability 118 
between current, historical and future levels of food insecurity at a national or global scale. This 119 
approach has become the standard for rapid assessment of undernourishment as an indicator of food 120 
security. The FAO indicator of the Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) is defined as ‘the percentage 121 
of a population whose food intake in terms of dietary energy in kilocalories is insufficient to meet 122 
requirements on a continual basis’ (Hall et al., 2017). It is  an internationally recognized indicator 123 
routinely used by international agencies, governments and NGOs alike since 1998 and is evaluated 124 
with reference to a mean daily calorie threshold. This is described as a Minimum Dietary Energy 125 
Requirement (MDER) as established by nutritionists, and a probability distribution of habitual Dietary 126 
Energy Consumption of a representative individual in a population. Each country has a mean per-127 
capita MDER threshold based upon their demographic structure, therefore the proportion of the 128 
population with food consumption below the MDER is considered by the model as undernourished. 129 
The relatively simple parametric methodology used  to calculate PoU for a population is able to 130 
account for two of the important aspects of food insecurity, specifically;  availability, 131 
using mean calories (kcal.person-1.yr-1) estimated from Food Balance Sheets (FBS), and 132 
differential access, estimated from a measure of the inequality of access to food across a population. 133 
The latter, drawing upon extensive household surveys, uses a two-parameter log-normal or three-134 
parameter skew-normal and skew-lognormal curves to define a stylised relationship between 135 
household income and food consumption whose shape is characterised by a coefficient of variation 136 
(CV) as a parameter accounting for inequality in food consumption and a skewness (SK) parameter 137 
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accounting for asymmetry in the distribution. Further information on the equations and assumptions 138 
used to derive CV and SK directly from available household survey data are described in Wanner et 139 
al., 2014. Likewise indirect methods through using macroeconomic relationships between CV and 140 
national-level Gini coefficient of income inequality (Gini), GDP, and infant mortality data are also 141 
described ( Wanner et al., 2014). 142 
 143 
Figure 1. Systematic diagram of FEEDME model (Dawson et al., 2016) 144 
FEEDME integrates the FAO methodology with country level statistics from the FAOSTAT database for 145 
use in future scenarios of climate, population and socio-economic changes. Within this database, food 146 
balance sheets (FBS) are compiled for each country annually, which are assumed to be the best 147 
available data despite their limitations for LICs. They specify estimates of national-level food 148 
production, imports, exports and food availability on a per-capita basis as well as in calorific values for 149 
all food commodities. The FBS for 175 countries were downloaded from the FAOSTAT website and 150 
subsequently reformatted to standardise spreadsheets for automatic manipulation of the data using 151 
the FEEDME model. Specifically, three aspects were altered manually; (a) changes in crop yields, and 152 
hence crop production, as a result of climate change (b) land use change in terms of total area under 153 
cultivation and (c) population changes under each scenario. 154 
The first aspect manually altered was changes in crop yields under climate scenarios. This analysis 155 
covers two Representative Concentration Pathways which are the latest atmospheric concentration 156 
scenarios adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for its fifth Assessment 157 
Environmental change impacts on food security 
6 
 
Report in 2014. We use RCP2.6 and RCP6.0 which were elected for their representativeness at the end 158 
of the 21st century (van Vuuren et al., 2011; Van Meijl et al., 2017). RCP2.6 represents the range of 159 
lowest greenhouse gas emissions, requiring strict climate policies to limit emissions and is also the 160 
lowest in terms of energy intensity (van Vuuren et al., 2011). RCP6.0 has a heavy reliance on fossil 161 
fuels, whilst RCP2.6 sees declines in use of oil as a result of depletion and climate policy (van Vuuren 162 
et al., 2011). Climate change effects on crop yields from these two scenarios were incorporated into 163 
the FEEDME model using regionally aggregated annual growth rates for three reference crops; wheat, 164 
maize and soybean (Van Meijl et al., 2017). The relative change in production from the baseline year 165 
(2000) for the three reference crops were mapped to a wider list of food items (Table 1) in the 166 
countries FBS as outlined in Dawson et al. (2016).  167 
Table 1. Assignment of FBS commodities to reference crops for projection of production changes 168 
Group Reference Crop FBS commodities: summary FBS commodities: individual 
C4 (cf maize) Maize crop yield 
data  
Cereals, sugar crops, 
Vegetable Oils 
maize, millet, sorghum, sugarcane, 
maize germ oil 
C3 (cf wheat) Wheat crop yield 
data 
Cereals, Alcoholic Beverages wheat, rice, barley, rye, oats, other 
cereals, beer 
C3 (cf soy) 
 
Soybean crop yield 
data 
Pulses, Oilcrops, Vegetable 
Oils 
Soyabeans, groundnuts, 
sunflowerseed, rape and 
mustardseed, cottonseed, 
sesameseed, other oilcrops, 
soyabean oil, groundnut oil, 
sunflowerseed oil, rape and mustard 
oil, cottonseed oil, sesameseed oil 
Other No change Starchy roots, sugar crops, 
treenuts, vegetables, fruits 
stimulants, spices, 
miscellaneous 
Sugar beet, honey, coconuts, 
palmkernels, olives, palmkernel oil, 
palm oil, coconut oil, olive oil, wine, 
beverages (fermented and alcoholic) 
Meat/dairy Currently assume no 
change 
Meat, offals - edible, animal 
fats (inc milk), eggs  
 
Aquatic Currently assume no 
change 
Fish, seafood; fish oils; 
aquatic products, other 
 
Sugars & 
Sweeteners 
Based on dominant 
production from 
either sugarcane 
(C4) or beet (no 
change) above 
  
 169 
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The three reference crops were chosen due to their global significance, as well as reasons of data 170 
availability and modelling complexity. Although this approach has limitations, the individual crops 171 
chosen represent three large crop categories. All crops follow a C3 or C4 photosynthetic pathway, 172 
hence it is assumed that changes in productivity will be similar for crops categorised into monocot C3 173 
(wheat),  monocot C4 (maize) or dicot C3 (soy) when grown in optimal conditions with no constraint 174 
on resources. It is important to note, there are a range of factors which have not been considered 175 
which would produce variation between different crops and are outside the scope of this study. 176 
However for some, e.g. differences due to light-use efficiency (LUE) of individual crops (the ratio of 177 
net primary productivity to absorbed photosynthetically active radiation)) the difference is minimal(1–178 
2%). The chosen reference crops vary in their LUE from high to low (Slattery & Ort, 2015), hence can 179 
represent a wide range of crops, but the differences in LUE have a much smaller effect on productivity 180 
in comparison to climate change effects incorporated within the crop model data used for this study. 181 
For each region, we calculated total change in crop yields over the 50 year period 2000-2050 based 182 
on estimated annual growth rates for each of the reference crops from biophysical crop modelling 183 
data produced under AgMIP (Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project, Van Meijl 184 
et al., 2017), which were regionally aggregated into thirteen coherent spatial regions. This was used 185 
to revise the crop production values in the FBS for each country based on the region within which it 186 
was located.   187 
Three Shared Socio-economic Pathways; SSP1, 2 and 3 were also used to provide the model with 188 
population and land use change projections, which were the other two aspects manually altered in 189 
the model. The SSP scenarios are defined as ‘reference pathways describing plausible alternative 190 
trends in the evolution of society and ecosystems over a century timescale’ (O’Neill et al., 2014). SSP1 191 
is the ‘greenest’ scenario, representing low challenges for mitigation and adaptation to climate 192 
change. Sustainable development proceeds at a high pace, lessening global inequalities and there is 193 
rapid technological change towards low carbon energy sources. SSP2 is an intermediate scenario 194 
representing moderate challenges and a future where development trends follow a ‘middle of the 195 
road’ pathway consistent with typical patterns observed over the last century. SSP3 represents 196 
significant challenges for mitigation and adaptation to climate change, with slow technological change 197 
and a rapidly growing population. Emissions are unmitigated, there are reduced trade flows and, due 198 
to a lack of investment in human capital, large numbers of people are left vulnerable to climate change 199 
impacts with low adaptive capacity. (O’Neill et al., 2017). This scenario, when coupled with RCP6.0 200 
(RCP6.0 SSP3) is what we describe as the scenario with the highest global impact (HGI), whilst SSP1 201 
with RCP2.6 (RCP2.6 SSP1) is described as the scenario with the lowest global impact (LGI). 202 
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In this study we look specifically at change in total area of cropland under each SSP scenario, using 203 
land use change data from the IMAGE 3.0 model. The change in total cropland area from 2010-2050 204 
was extracted per country and percentage increase calculated over the specified time frame. Although 205 
country FBS existed for 175 countries as examined in Dawson et al. (2016), we examine only 159 here, 206 
due to a lack of availability of either land use change or population data for the excluded countries. 207 
These countries were often small islands for which the land use change data were not available due 208 
to the coarseness of the data.  209 
The FEEDME model was run for each of the 159 countries both for the baseline period (2000-2002) 210 
and for projections to the year 2050, using population projections taken from each SSP scenario a well 211 
as modifying the crop yield and land use changes as described above. Although the baseline is 2000, 212 
the FBS were based on the mean of years 2000-2002 to reduce effects of any anomalous change in 213 
production in any one year. Both the total number of people undernourished and the 214 
undernourishment prevalence (probability of undernourishment) were produced as results, yet we 215 
present only the latter in this study. This is to enable comparison with previous studies (Dawson et al., 216 
2016; Hall et al., 2017) as well as official FAO publications. The model adopts the following 217 
assumptions:- 218 
(i) national level population demographic structures (age and gender) remain the same as 219 
the year 2000; 220 
(ii) income and food inequality Gini coefficients remain the same as the year 2000 values; 221 
(iii) minimum dietary energy requirements (MDER) for a country remain constant 222 
throughout the 21st century; 223 
(iv) food trade (imports and exports) are held constant through the 21st century for each 224 
country; 225 
(v) dietary patterns remain constant until 2050. 226 
 227 
These assumptions pose a limitation to the model, particularly the assumption of no change to food 228 
imports and exports, as this leads to a projected increase in undernourishment even without climate 229 
change effects, due to population growth projections if the country cannot meet population 230 
requirements through national production. Whilst the assumption of no change in international trade 231 
is unrealistic, the results highlights the potential shortfall in imports which are needed to address 232 
national food needs. Hence undernourishment prevalence should be interpreted as an indicator of 233 
exposure to undernourishment in the absence of no adaptation or mitigation responses. When faced 234 
with an increased proportion of people who are undernourished, responses often consist of increasing 235 
national food production or changing international food trade agreements, which are difficult to 236 
predict.  237 
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Results 238 
Undernourishment for the baseline period 2000-2002 is shown in Figure 2 for which the prevalence 239 
of undernourishment scale was adopted from the FAO Hunger Map 2015. To validate model results, 240 
we compare baseline figures produced by FEEDME for each country to published FAO figures for the 241 
period 2000-2002 (FAO 2004). This showed that 88% of listed ‘developing’ and ‘in transition’ countries 242 
were within 5% of FEEDME results, with a Person’s correlation coefficient of 0.98. It is worth noting 243 
that FAO does not differentiate below 2.5% undernourishment prevalence, hence countries with less 244 
undernourishment prevalence were listed as 2.5%. The vast majority of countries not listed in this 245 
report in North America and Europe were shown to have <2.5% undernourished according to web-246 
based data. When these countries are also incorporated, 90% of countries are shown to be within 5% 247 
difference, with a Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.99 (Appendix A). Minor differences are 248 
explained by FEEDME using population values from the year 2000, whilst the FAO results are based on 249 
an average of three years of undernourishment calculations (2000-2002).   250 
 251 
  252 
 253 
 254 
 255 
 256 
 257 
 258 
 259 
Figure 2. Global map showing the proportion of the population undernourished in each country for 260 
the baseline period 2000-2002 as simulated by the FEEDME model. 261 
Undernourishment prevalence for RCP2.6 SSP1 and RCP6.0 SSP3 are presented (Figure 3, 4), which 262 
incorporate land use change. These scenarios are the lowest and highest impact on global food 263 
security, with RCP2.6 SSP1 having the lowest average prevalence of undernourishment globally and 264 
RCP6.0 SSP3 having the highest (Figure 5). 265 
In both the lowest and highest global impact scenarios, there is a considerable increase in the number 266 
of countries with a very high prevalence of undernourishment (Figure 2-4), particularly in the HGI 267 
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scenario (Figure 4). In this scenario, almost the whole of Latin America, Africa and parts of South East 268 
Asia are projected to have a very high prevalence of undernourishment (Figure 4). This scenario shows 269 
significant polarisation between HICs and LICs, with most countries either being in the top or bottom 270 
category of the undernourishment prevalence scale (Figure 4).  In contrast, for the LGI scenario, 271 
although the majority of Africa is still projected to have a very high prevalence of undernourishment, 272 
there is considerably more variation across Latin America and South East Asia (Figure 3). 273 
 274 
 275 
 276 
 277 
 278 
  279 
 280 
 281 
 282 
Figure 3. Global map showing the proportion of the population undernourished in each country for 283 
the lowest global impact (LGI) scenario, RCP2.6 SSP1 284 
 285 
 286 
 287 
 288 
 289 
 290 
 291 
 292 
 293 
Figure 4. Global map showing the proportion of the population undernourished in each country for 294 
highest global impact (HGI) scenario, RCP6.0 SSP3 295 
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 296 
 297 
Figure 5. Graph showing the mean global undernourishment prevalence across all scenarios 298 
compared to the 2000-2002 baseline 299 
Figure 5 shows the global average undernourishment prevalence for the baseline as well as each of 300 
the scenarios. In every scenario, undernourishment prevalence more than triples. The baseline shows 301 
less than 15% undernourishment, whilst every scenario shows an average of over 50% being 302 
undernourished. This graph also shows RCP2.6 SSP1 being the LGI scenario and RCP6.0 SSP3 being the 303 
HGI, with the highest prevalence of undernourishment globally, reaching almost 60% (Figure 5).  304 
For the vast majority of regions, scenarios all show higher mean prevalence of undernourishment than 305 
the baseline, with the exception of China for which two scenarios show a lower undernourishment 306 
prevalence (Figure 6). There is variation in the patterns shown compared to the scenarios observed 307 
on the global scale. For example, in LICs  such as in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), Brazil (BRA) and Other 308 
South America (OSA), the same pattern is shown across the scenarios, with RCP2.6 SSP1 being the 309 
lowest impact and RCP6.0 SSP3, the highest, with impacts increasing across SSPs 1-3 (Figure 6). The 310 
opposite effect, however, is seen in HICs, for example in Europe (EUR), Canada (CAN) and America 311 
(USA), with the lowest impact seen in RCP6.0 SSP3 and the highest in RCP2.6 SSP1 (Figure 6).  312 
 313 
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 314 
Figure 6. Graph showing the mean undernourishment prevalence across all scenarios within each 315 
region defined by (Van Meijl et al., 2017). 316 
Discussion 317 
Agricultural production is very vulnerable to climate change (Osborne et al., 2013). Climate change 318 
will affect temperature, precipitation and wind speed which all have an effect on water availability 319 
and other ecosystem services on which agriculture relies, hence consequentially on crop yields (Calvin 320 
et al., 2013). Therefore, understanding the impact of these changes on food production is essential to 321 
ensure future global food security (Zhao et al., 2017). There are limited positive impacts of climate 322 
change, for example, longer growing season in northerly latitudes. However, the vast majority of 323 
results are homogeneous across major food crops and geographical areas, with decreases in yield 324 
projected for each climate scenario (Zhao et al., 2017; Wiebe et al., 2015). Adverse impacts of climate 325 
change are particularly strong for oilseeds (Wiebe et al., 2015) which could contribute to regional 326 
variation in undernourishment prevalence. However, for all crops considered in this study, there are 327 
only a small handful of regions under each climate scenario which are projected to see small increases 328 
in annual growth rates from 2000-2050 (Van Meijl et al., 2017). Hence when coupled with projected 329 
population growth, land use change i.e. cropland expansion is not shown to contribute significantly to 330 
food security. Results from this study show both globally (Figure 5) and in the vast majority of regions 331 
(Figure 6) and countries (Appendix B), there is a higher risk of undernourishment in every scenario 332 
examined (Figure 5).  333 
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For every scenario, undernourishment prevalence dramatically increases compared to the baseline, 334 
which averages 13% (Figure 5). This is also the case on a regional scale, with one exception (Figure 6). 335 
For China, two scenarios show a lower prevalence of undernourishment: RCP2.6 SSP1 and SSP2. The 336 
reason for this is both a reduction in population in SSP1 and 2, and higher crop yields in RCP2.6 as 337 
opposed to RCP6.0. Higher crop yields, combined with lower population projections, results in lower 338 
prevalence of undernourishment. This is despite decreases in total cropland area in these scenarios, 339 
showing that climate and population changes have a larger effect in this region. Previous studies in 340 
China also show projected decreases in cropland area, yet these climate scenarios show climate 341 
change to have a largely positive effect on crop yields, which combined with a plateauing population, 342 
exert a great impact on future trends of food security (Ye et al., 2013).  343 
Although at the global scale the scenario with the largest impacts on the prevalence of 344 
undernourishment is RCP6.0 SSP3 (Figure 5), patterns vary considerably between regions (Figure 6). A 345 
clear difference is seen between low and high income regions, with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Latin 346 
America showing the same patterns as the global mean (Figure 5,6). In contrast, high income regions 347 
including North America and Europe (EUR) show the opposite pattern, where the largest projected 348 
prevalence of undernourishment is seen in what we describe as the ‘lowest global impact’ scenario 349 
(Figure 6). This is also shown when the difference between the LGI and HGI scenarios are examined. 350 
As expected, the majority of regions show an increase in percentage of undernourished, however for 351 
Australasia, Canada, Europe and the United States of America, there is a decrease (Appendix C). 352 
There are several reasons for this, one being that the effects on crop yields tend to be less severe at 353 
higher latitudes which tend to be more developed (Calvin et al., 2013). In one study, the largest 354 
negative changes in crop yield as a result of climate change, with no adaptation occurs in LICs, 355 
averaging -9 to -11%, whilst in the majority of scenarios, production in HICs is estimated to increase 356 
by up to 11% (Parry, Rosenzweig and Livermore, 2005). In RCP6.0 in particular, the annual growth 357 
rates of major crops are higher in high income regions compared to tropical areas (Van Meijl et al., 358 
2017). Furthermore, population growth is projected to be significantly lower for HICs (UN, 2019) and 359 
even decreases in SSP3 for some countries such as Canada. Therefore, smaller populations combined 360 
with increased crop yields results in undernourishment being less prevalent. 361 
For low income regions however, population growth is projected to be the most extreme, with the 362 
majority occurring in sub-Saharan Africa (UN, 2019). Projections predict that Africa’s population will 363 
double from one to two billion by 2050 (Foresight, 2011) and rapid population growth is expected 364 
even when assuming a substantial reduction of fertility levels (UN, 2019). This is due to ‘replacement-365 
level fertility’ which means that even if the number of births per woman falls instantly to levels which 366 
will stabilise the population growth, it will continue to increase in future decades because of the young 367 
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age structure of the population (UN, 2019). The concentration of population growth in the poorest 368 
countries will make it more difficult for governments to combat food insecurity and eradicate poverty 369 
(UN, 2019).  370 
Across every scenario examined, almost the whole of the continent of Africa is in the ‘Very high’ 371 
category of undernourishment prevalence (Appendix B). There are a couple of exceptions across all 372 
six scenarios, which are Morocco and Tunisia (Appendix B). For SSP1, Libya is also an exception yet is 373 
still in the ‘High’ category of undernourishment prevalence (Figure 2, Appendix B). South Africa 374 
however shows the most extreme difference between the LGI and HGI scenarios, moving from 375 
‘Moderately low’ to ‘Very high’, an increase of over 30% of its population projected to be 376 
undernourished. For the majority of scenarios, it is not in the highest category of undernourishment 377 
(Appendix B), a pattern also shown in (Hall et al., 2017). Without the impacts of climate change, Tunisia 378 
and Morocco are also shown as exceptions (Hall et al., 2017), however this study shows more severe 379 
impacts with the most recent climate change scenarios.  380 
Although not shown in the scale used, the vast majority of countries in Sub Saharan Africa project over 381 
95% of the population to be undernourished in the HGI and over 70% in LGI, excluding only South 382 
Africa, Lesotho and Mauritius. Furthermore, when compared to the baseline scenario, there is an 383 
astonishing average across all scenarios of a 91% increase of the population projected to become 384 
undernourished by 2050 (Appendix D). Sub-Saharan Africa not only shows the largest increase in 385 
undernourishment but also shows the smallest difference between LGI and HGI scenarios (Figure 3, 4, 386 
Appendix C). Therefore, regardless of the future pathway taken, future undernourishment prevalence 387 
is projected to be severe for this region. 388 
These extreme rates of undernourishment prevalence have previously been attributed to an increase 389 
in food demand driven by population growth, overshadowing the effects of climate change (Hall et al., 390 
2017). This is also the case in this study, with a larger effect shown between socio-economic scenarios 391 
than climate scenarios. The climate scenarios used however do not include the higher emissions 392 
pathways (RCP 8.5), hence this finding is potentially a result of there being similar climate change 393 
impacts across low to moderate emissions pathways (Wiebe et al., 2015). This is seen in the example 394 
of sub-Saharan Africa, where undernourishment prevalence increases by 5% in Sub-Saharan Africa 395 
between SSP1 and 3, yet only increases by 1% between RCP2.6 and 6.0. The impact of land use is even 396 
smaller, although on a global scale land use change will decrease undernourishment prevalence in 397 
SSP2 and 3. This is largely due to cropland expansion, of which there is less in SSP1; hence in this 398 
scenario, land use change increases undernourishment prevalence. However, there is less than a 1% 399 
difference for SSA when excluded, suggesting that the main driver of undernourishment prevalence 400 
will be driven by population growth.  401 
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The largest difference between the LGI and HGI scenarios is seen in South America, with an average 402 
increase in undernourishment of almost 30%, including Brazil (Appendix C). This is also reflected in 403 
Figures 2-4. There are no countries above the ‘Moderately high’ category in the baseline scenario 404 
(Figure 2), however several are projected to have ‘Very High’ undernourishment prevalence in the LGI 405 
scenario, with all countries excluding Guyana being ‘Very high’ in the HGI scenario (Figure 4). 406 
Therefore, unlike Sub-Saharan Africa, future prevalence of undernourishment in South America will 407 
be highly reliant on the pathway society and climate change take. Climate change has a larger impact 408 
on this region with an average increase of 4% of the population becoming undernourished in RCP6.0 409 
compared to RCP2.6. However, the biggest difference again is seen between SSP pathways, with a 410 
20% increase in undernourishment prevalence between SSP1 and SSP3.  411 
Like with Sub-Saharan Africa, if populations continue to increase while climate change reduces food 412 
production, there is likely to be increased undernourishment in the future. Although not shown in this 413 
study, the country with the highest numbers of people projected to be undernourished by 2050 as 414 
opposed to proportion of the population, across every scenario including the baseline, is India. It also 415 
has some of the highest proportions of its population projected to be undernourished (Figure 6) as 416 
well as the largest increase in proportion of its population undernourished when compared to the 417 
baseline scenario (Appendix D), after Sub Saharan Africa. Future projections with the lowest 418 
population growth in LICs have been shown to have the largest reduction in risk of hunger (Parry et 419 
al., 2005). However even within SSP1 where population growth is the lowest, there is still severe 420 
undernourishment prevalence (Appendix B). 421 
This indicates that even in best case scenarios like SSP1, efforts still result in undernourishment being 422 
very high purely because of the assumption of no adaptation response. Population growth and 423 
demographic change are some of the biggest challenges for the food system in the next few decades 424 
(Godfray & Garnett, 2014). Drivers of fertility are a complex topic and it is beyond the scope of this 425 
paper to engage fully on this topic, but adaptations could include supporting continued increase in 426 
access to reproductive health care, including family planning, especially in LICs (UN, 2019). This, as 427 
well as improvements to education, can have positive effects on reducing fertility whilst also 428 
improving women’s wellbeing and livelihoods (UN, 2019; Nargund, 2009; Lutz et al., 2008). In LICs, 429 
fertility rates tend to be higher, however there is often a reduction in birth rates due to high maternal 430 
and perinatal mortality (Nargund, 2009). Therefore improved health care to reduce mortality rates 431 
would, according to conventional demographic theory, lead to natural declines in fertility (Bongaarts 432 
and Casterline, 2012).  433 
As well as a lack of access to contraceptives and generally lower levels of female education, high 434 
fertility rates in LICs are often ascribed to the need for a labour force and to provide care for parents 435 
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in old age, (Nargund, 2009). Fertility preferences however tend to change as a country develops and 436 
there is a strong inverse correlation between development indicators and fertility (Bongaarts and 437 
Casterline, 2012). Countries with declining population growth rates often see benefits in their 438 
economy and reductions in poverty (Lutz et al., 2008). Increased levels of income and education can 439 
then potentially in turn lead to fertility rates naturally declining (Nargund, 2009).  440 
Other mitigation strategies include greater global investment in appropriate technology improvement 441 
as this is crucial for reducing environmental impacts of meeting future increased crop demand (Willet 442 
et al., 2019; Tilman et al., 2011). This is largely due to strategic, sustainable intensification, which has 443 
the potential to elevate yields of existing croplands of under-yielding nations and can meet the 444 
majority of 2050 global crop demand with limited land clearing and GHG emissions (Tilman et al., 445 
2011). Africa in particular continues to have large yield gaps (Luan et al., 2018) and seeing as this is 446 
the region with the highest undernourishment prevalence projected, closing the yield gap could make 447 
a significant difference. However, the maximum attainable yield will shift with climate change effects, 448 
therefore maintaining or increasing productivity to close yield gaps will require continued innovation 449 
(Godfray et al., 2010). Improvements in fertiliser and water use efficiency as well as enhancing 450 
biodiversity and closing nutrient loops are also essential for sustainably intensifying food production 451 
and closing yield gaps (Willet et al., 2019). Substantial increases in public and private investment in 452 
technology and human resources are needed internationally, especially in low income countries to 453 
ensure agricultural systems are sustainable, but there are few incentives for the private sector 454 
(Godfray and Garnett, 2014). Hence it is important to note that although technological change could 455 
have a significant impact on food security, the socio-political will to ensure it becomes a reality is 456 
essential, andour results emphasise how crucial it is that we act quickly and effectively to avoid 457 
alarming rates of global food insecurity in the future. 458 
There are a number of limitations to this study. In the undernourishment scale used to create the 459 
hunger maps, any countries with an undernourishment prevalence of over 35% were shown in the 460 
same category. Thus, variation in undernourishment above this threshold is not shown. Yet  when the 461 
scale is altered to ‘equal intervals’, there is little difference, with almost the whole of sub-Saharan 462 
Africa still in the highest category of undernourishment prevalence.  There are also limitations of using 463 
only three reference crops, which were used due to global importance and availability of climate 464 
change impacts on yields. Despite being representative of a large proportion of commodities (Slattery 465 
& Ort, 2015), undernourishment prevalence for countries that rely heavily on, for example roots and 466 
tubers, is likely to be over-estimated. Hence, results should be seen as indicative, not absolute. 467 
Inclusion of other globally important crops such as rice as the data become available would also be a 468 
significant contribution to future research. Although it is important to note that production 469 
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differences for individual crops will show a similar order of magnitude of change from climate change 470 
impacts, due to the similar but limited mechanisms of the photosynthetic pathways for all crop types. 471 
Projected changes in meat or fish production are not included in the modelled scenarios. Whilst meat 472 
and fish are important sources of dietary protein, they only contribute a relatively small percentage 473 
of the total mean energy budget per capita (Dawson et al., 2016).  In countries that consume higher 474 
proportions of meat and fish, for example the USA, it still only accounts for 12% and in LICs, this 475 
percentage is insignificant. Meat products in LICs contribute about 5% to per capita calorie 476 
consumption and consumption levels have changed relatively little over the last 30 years. Livestock 477 
production is also expected to show very low growth rates under future projections, with less than 478 
1.6% annual growth rate on a global basis to 2030, with some HICs currently showing a decline in meat 479 
production (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012).Yet it is still important to note that inclusion of climate 480 
change impacts on livestock could alter the results. For example, the quality and quantity of crops 481 
used as feed for livestock, as well as changes in species composition in grassland systems impacting 482 
livestock productivity (Thornton et al., 2009). Hence, it is recommended that future research 483 
incorporate pasture as well as area under cropland within land use change variables. Although 484 
comprising of relatively few calories, these food sources are essential for delivering certain 485 
micronutrients, for example zinc, iron and B14 (Herrero et al., 2013; Nelson et al., 2018), which global 486 
studies often neglect. There is an important role therefore for animal source foods in achieving 487 
nutrition security, as opposed to food security (Nelson et al., 2018) and even small levels of 488 
consumption can substantially reduce undernutrition (Neuman et al., 2003; Randolph et al., 2007). 489 
Although incorporation into global modelling is unlikely, it could be possible to model on smaller 490 
scales, dependent on local data availability. Yet for both inclusion of meat production and more 491 
reference crops, it is highly likely that these changes will be minimal when compared to the extreme 492 
rise in projections of undernourishment from population growth and continued inequality of access 493 
to food, which remains a challenge.  494 
Hidden hunger in the form of micronutrient deficiency is of particular concern in LICs and in some 495 
cases, climate change noticeably lowers adequacy ratios (Nelson et al., 2018). This is not captured 496 
using FAO methodology, hence it is important to note that results of this study do not represent a 497 
comprehensive assessment of food security. In recognising the complexity of monitoring food 498 
insecurity, the FAO (2001) stated “no direct measure of the state of food insecurity in the world will 499 
ever be possible” due to the inability to measure all of the dimensions that constitute food security at 500 
the level of individuals in a population. This methodology does cover two of the important aspects of 501 
food insecurity specifically availability of food, and differential access, and remains the de facto 502 
standard for reporting on the outcomes of policy interventions. However, a number of assumptions 503 
and limitations exist relating to both theoretical foundation and the methodological principles of a 504 
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parametric approach. The methodology uses few parameters and variables that are used to 505 
characterise undernourishment. But these have been calculated from extensive household survey 506 
data and national agricultural census data to estimate the distribution of access to food across a 507 
population and Food Balance Sheets (FBS) respectively.  508 
Concerning the FEEDME model, there are three main areas of uncertainty. Firstly, the use of the curve 509 
fit to characterise the variability of distribution of food consumption across the whole population. 510 
Secondly, estimates of the cut-off point for intake inadequacy defined on the basis of Minimum 511 
Dietary Energy Requirements (MDER) referring to the specification of the basic metabolic rates of 512 
individuals, which vary with sex, age, and the level of physical activity (Anand et al., 1992; de Haen et 513 
al., 2011 ).  Thirdly, the utility and accuracy of FBS, which accounts for food availability, as a proxy for 514 
food consumption.  Whilst there have been criticisms (Naiken, 2007), the log-normal (skewed curve) 515 
model was initially adopted due its simplicity, requiring only two parameters to characterise it, 516 
specifically the mean calories and a coefficient of variation of dietary energy consumption 517 
(kcal.Person-1.Day-1) owing to income inequalities, expressed in terms of the well-known Gini 518 
coefficient. In 2012, the more flexible three parameter skew-normal and skew-lognormal curves were 519 
adopted to account for more varying degrees of asymmetry and where more information from 520 
household surveys were available. Yet in defence of the methodology, the FAO has demonstrated it 521 
delivers an appropriate inference on the individual state of undernourishment through appropriate 522 
statistical treatment of available data, even if that data is poor or inadequate (Cafiero, 2014). 523 
The assumption of no changes to trade is also a limitation as there would be a projected increase in 524 
undernourishment based only on population growth (Dawson et al., 2016). This assumption produces 525 
a few unexpected results. Australia for example, is quite unexpectedly predicted to incur very high 526 
rates of undernourishment prevalence in the majority of scenarios compared to other HICs (Appendix 527 
B).  It is also projected to have the largest decrease of undernourishment when comparing the LGI to 528 
the HGI scenario (Appendix C). This is because there is reduction in crop yields as a result of climate 529 
change, as well as a decrease in cropland and an increase in population. Therefore by assuming current 530 
trade levels stay the same, for example, the country exports two-thirds of all grain produced, it is less 531 
surprising that Australia is projected an increase in undernourishment prevalence. However, the 532 
results of this study should therefore be treated as the proportion of the population potentially at risk 533 
of undernourishment, which trade could at least partly ameliorate. 534 
Countries with high GDP have the capacity to reduce their food insecurity in times of crisis by altering 535 
their trade patterns. For example, Russia in 2010 banned all exports after drought and wildfires 536 
devastated domestic crops (Wegren, 2010). However, changes in trade do not improve food 537 
availability for all (Porkka et al., 2013) . An increasing dependency on trade may lead to improved food 538 
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availability for example, but mainly in regions with strong economies (Porkka et al., 2013). It is 539 
therefore a significant challenge for regions such as sub-Saharan Africa which often rely heavily on 540 
food aid due to the lack the purchasing power needed to improve their own food security.  541 
Conclusion 542 
Although climate change is predicted to have a large impact on future food security, this paper shows 543 
that population growth and land use change could have the largest impact. This study highlights the 544 
severity of potential hunger prevalence in the near future, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, across all 545 
scenarios if rapid mitigation measures are not taken. Some of these mitigation measures will be 546 
location specific; however increased access to healthcare, closing the yield gap and reforming trade in 547 
LICs are three options that could help to reduce the threat of future undernourishment, reverse 548 
current trends of increasing food insecurity and help to meet the Sustainable Development Goal to 549 
eradicate global hunger by 2030.  550 
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Appendices 687 
Appendix A. Table showing undernourishment values for 159 countries generated by the FEEDME 688 
model compared to FAO values for baseline period 2000-2002. 689 
Countries FEEDME FAO Difference 
Albania 4.92692029 6 -1.07308 
Algeria 4.558194472 5 -0.44181 
Angola 35.36696135 40 -4.63304 
Argentina 2.5 2.5 0 
Armenia 29.18609593 34 -4.8139 
Australia 2.5 2.5 0 
Austria 2.5 2.5 0 
Azerbaijan 11.1865929 15 -3.81341 
Bahamas 4.719992272 n/a n/a 
Bangladesh 27.99151082 30 -2.00849 
Barbados 2.5 n/a n/a 
Belarus 2.5 2.5 0 
Belgium 2.5 2.5 0 
Belize 3.196159453 n/a n/a 
Benin 11.84184776 15 -3.15815 
Bolivia 19.97775643 21 -1.02224 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 7.5172141 8 -0.48279 
Botswana 26.56453455 32 -5.43547 
Brazil 7.08846407 9 -1.91154 
Brunei Darussalam 2.702363241 n/a n/a 
Bulgaria 8.195257235 11 -2.80474 
Burkina Faso 15.41258966 19 -3.58741 
Burundi 61.73783628 68 -6.26216 
Cambodia 30.07121959 33 -2.92878 
Cameroon 21.8979724 25 -3.10203 
Canada 2.5 2.5 0 
Central African Republic 39.4130695 43 -3.58693 
Chad 29.49745539 34 -4.50254 
Chile 2.902785759 4 -1.09721 
China 10.35675725 11 -0.64324 
Colombia 11.20459899 13 -1.7954 
Comoros 55.50843873 n/a n/a 
Congo 35.33573298 37 -1.66427 
Congo (Democratic Republic of 
the) 
65.41766187 71 -5.58234 
Costa Rica 3.333620646 4 -0.66638 
Côte d'Ivoire 11.21776147 14 -2.78224 
Croatia 7.745260943 7 0.745261 
Cuba 2.5 3 -0.5 
Cyprus 2.5 n/a n/a 
Czech Republic 2.5 2.5 0 
Denmark 2.5 2.5 0 
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Djibouti 30.26559251 n/a n/a 
Dominican Republic 13.98294329 25 -11.0171 
Ecuador 3.461978333 4 -0.53802 
Egypt 2.524953702 3 -0.47505 
El Salvador 9.188097375 11 -1.8119 
Eritrea 81.99778217 73 8.997782 
Estonia 3.647903156 5 -1.3521 
Ethiopia 42.92373864 46 -3.07626 
Fiji 3.287198284 n/a n/a 
Finland 2.5 2.5 0 
France 2.5 2.5 0 
Gabon 4.714235516 6 -1.28576 
Gambia 22.25377495 27 -4.74623 
Georgia 16.02238544 27 -10.9776 
Germany 2.5 2.5 0 
Ghana 9.646012157 13 -3.35399 
Greece 2.5 2.5 0 
Guatemala 19.42379303 24 -4.57621 
Guinea 21.73795078 26 -4.26205 
Guinea-Bissau 28.60509262 n/a n/a 
Guyana 7.816673672 9 -1.18333 
Haiti 41.87429285 47 -5.12571 
Honduras 19.19689161 22 -2.80311 
Hungary 2.5 2.5 0 
Iceland 2.5 2.5 0 
India 21.13894213 21 0.138942 
Indonesia 5.788677351 6 -0.21132 
Iran 3.381848349 4 -0.61815 
Ireland 2.5 2.5 0 
Israel 2.5 2.5 0 
Italy 2.5 2.5 0 
Jamaica 8.183848351 10 -1.81615 
Japan 5.580568675 2.5 3.080569 
Jordan 6.023338221 7 -0.97666 
Kazakhstan 10.65960058 13 -2.3404 
Kenya 25.20931401 33 -7.79069 
Kuwait 4.081377008 5 -0.91862 
Kyrgyzstan 4.491279816 6 -1.50872 
Laos 18.60873975 22 -3.39126 
Latvia 2.871976043 4 -1.12802 
Lebanon 2.5 3 -0.5 
Lesotho 8.733541219 12 -3.26646 
Liberia 39.13000269 46 -6.87 
Libya 2.5 n/a n/a 
Lithuania 2.5 2.5 0 
Luxembourg 2.5 2.5 0 
Macedonia 7.106513796 11 -3.89349 
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Madagascar 32.32749937 37 -4.6725 
Malawi 29.50697331 33 -3.49303 
Malaysia 2.5 2.5 0 
Maldives 7.696831716 n/a n/a 
Mali 22.72044215 29 -6.27956 
Malta 2.5 2.5 0 
Mauritania 7.841008233 10 -2.15899 
Mauritius 4.835172592 6 -1.16483 
Mexico 4.339675161 5 -0.66032 
Moldova 9.5000397 11 -1.49996 
Mongolia 24.78515327 28 -3.21485 
Morocco 5.26899591 7 -1.731 
Mozambique 39.82991832 47 -7.17008 
Myanmar 5.641057205 6 -0.35894 
Namibia 20.16442232 22 -1.83558 
Nepal 14.67329809 17 -2.3267 
Netherlands 2.5 2.5 0 
New Caledonia 8.714828017 n/a n/a 
New Zealand 2.5 2.5 0 
Nicaragua 23.91910969 27 -3.08089 
Niger 32.31433274 34 -1.68567 
Nigeria 7.246550297 9 -1.75345 
North Korea 31.67641263 36 -4.32359 
Norway 2.5 2.5 0 
Pakistan 19.81990822 20 -0.18009 
Panama 23.9682199 26 -2.03178 
Paraguay 12.53283239 14 -1.46717 
Peru 10.56307966 13 -2.43692 
Philippines 16.90889025 22 -5.09111 
Poland 2.5 2.5 0 
Portugal 2.5 2.5 0 
Romania 2.5 2.5 0 
Russia 2.801075768 4 -1.19892 
Rwanda 32.11087489 37 -4.88913 
Samoa 2.857288265 n/a n/a 
Saudi Arabia 3.044817229 3 0.044817 
Senegal 19.51257471 24 -4.48743 
Sierra Leone 46.15498126 50 -3.84502 
Slovakia 4.013357024 5 -0.98664 
Slovenia 2.5 2.5 0 
Solomon Islands 17.02734588 n/a n/a 
South Africa 2.5 n/a n/a 
South Korea 2.5 2.5 0 
Spain 2.5 2.5 0 
Sri Lanka 19.94639808 22 -2.0536 
Sudan 21.06486007 27 -5.93514 
Suriname 8.352073668 11 -2.64793 
Environmental change impacts on food security 
27 
 
Swaziland 15.27755375 19 -3.72245 
Sweden 2.5 2.5 0 
Switzerland 2.5 2.5 0 
Syria 2.854235917 4 -1.14576 
Tajikistan 56.22063434 61 -4.77937 
Tanzania 39.17990627 44 -4.82009 
Thailand 20.37395063 20 0.373951 
Togo 22.98879711 26 -3.0112 
Trinidad and Tobago 9.496585346 12 -2.50341 
Tunisia 2.5 2.5 0 
Turkey 2.5 3 -0.5 
Turkmenistan 7.358152696 9 -1.64185 
Uganda 15.39792118 19 -3.60208 
Ukraine 2.506402122 3 -0.4936 
United Arab Emirates 2.5 2.5 0 
United Kingdom 2.5 2.5 0 
United States 2.5 2.5 0 
Uruguay 2.948816474 4 -1.05118 
Uzbekistan 21.31693034 26 -4.68307 
Vanuatu 8.651361117 n/a n/a 
Venezuela 14.012229 17 -2.98777 
Vietnam 16.70161024 19 -2.29839 
Zambia 43.71487828 49 -5.28512 
Zimbabwe 39.097322 44 -4.90268 
 690 
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Appendix B: Panel of global maps showing prevalence of undernourishment under each of the six 692 
scenarios for RCP2.6 and 6.0, SSPs 1-3, including land use and population change but excluding feed 693 
and export compensation measures 694 
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Appendix C: Graph showing average percentage change in undernourishment prevalence per region 721 
between lowest global impact (LGI) and highest global impact (HGI) scenario 722 
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Appendix D: Graph showing average difference in undernourishment prevalence per region 738 
between the baseline and six scenarios examined 739 
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